Accidents of Melting Siachen Ice

The tragic incident at Ghayari, Siachen, where a 25-meter high hurtling wall of snow smothered a battalion headquarters and trapped 138 officers and men of the Pakistan Army under it, has riveted the national attention on this rather ignored battle front where more casualties are the result of natural disasters than the enemy action. Deployment at 180,000 to 22,000 feet covers an area that is unnatural for human habitation and full of unpredictable and invisible dangers.

Accidents are unavoidable rather inevitable and in line with the military culture, stoically accepted as a professional hazard in line of duty. Yet, the size and scale of the recent disaster have managed to bring the Siachen issue from the periphery of national consciousness to the centrestage of public attention. A debate has been kindled as to what pressing circumstances and vital national objectives have forced a deployment that necessitates such perilous presence and why the two countries cannot dismantle this costly and painful confrontation that, to start with, is a consequence of India’s stealthy aggression.

It was in 1984 that India moved the belligerent pursuit of the Kashmir dispute to the Siachen Glacier by occupying positions along Soltoro Ridgeline in an area, which had remained demilitarised ever since the Kashmir operations in 1948. Even when the Ceasefire Line (CFL) in Kashmir [dubbed Line of Control (LoC) vide Simla Agreement - 1972] between India and Pakistan came into force following the Karachi Agreement in 1949, as a consequence of the UN supervised ceasefire, it could not be extended to the glacier due to extreme constraints of an inhospitable terrain and inaccessibility. Its delineation ended at the last mutually agreed upon point in the northern area; village of Khor on the Shyok River, which was changed to a map reference point; NJ9842 during the Tashkent Conference. From Khor onwards, the Karachi Agreement then described alignment of the CFL as going “thence north to the glaciers”, leaving the ‘Line’ north of this point yet to be defined and demarcated. Pakistan considered the onwards continuation of the CFL to Karakoram Pass, which demarcated the Siachen glacier within Pakistani territory; a position on which the Pak-China Accord of 1963 was based and which was tacitly accepted by India. Other occasions of articulating the Indian dissenting position presented themselves later as well. India had an opportunity to challenge Pakistan’s claim at the time of Tashkent Conference in 1965 where the two countries agreed to change the terminal point of CFL and, more so, at Simla in 1972 when it had the chance to dictate terms; the CFL, now dubbed LoC, still terminated at NJ9842, despite small changes made to the erstwhile alignment of the CFL.

Following Simla, Pakistan continued to exercise administrative control over the Siachen glacier and opened it for international mountaineering expeditions in the mid-seventies. Various international atlases also reflected the Siachen glacier as part of Pakistan by showing the LoC as proceeding north eastwards towards the Karakorum Pass. However, the threat of an Indian aggression was surreptitiously taking shape in the manner of earlier occupation of the Kashmir valley by military aggression in October 1948; an Indian brigade strength force was landed on the northern end of the Siachen glacier in April 1984 to initiate another bleeding wound in the saga of Kashmir tragedy. Pakistan rushed in its troops to contain the Indian aggression and so began a senseless and costly conflict, shorn of any worthwhile strategic or military considerations that could justify the loss of life and heavy expenditure involved in maintaining troops in an area that is regarded as the highest battle ground in the world.

An extension of Indian hegemonic designs, the Indian occupation of the Siachen glacier remains an act of blatant aggression. It is a gross violation of not only the Karachi Agreement of 1949 but also Simla Agreement whose Para 4(2) stipulates: “In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of the mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.”

Heavy intermittent clashes ensued in the following years without affecting any significant change in the ground situation. Artillery duels continued to take place, even as the two sides refrained from introducing air power to further expand the zone of conflict. A modicum of rationality prevailed after five years when after an initial meeting of the military commanders the Indian and Pakistani delegations began talks for resolving the dispute in July 1989; a process that after 13 rounds of talks has yielded no tangible progress even as the earlier rounds were marked by anticipation that the area would be returned to a status quo ante, returning troops to a deployment prevailing in the area prior to the Indian aggression in 1984.

Notwithstanding the considerable common ground that should facilitate movement on Siachen, the Indian posturing has not been very encouraging; in fact, the later rounds of talks have indicated a marked degree of inflexibility in the Indian stance. Instead of rolling back aggression from Siachen, the Indians have insisted upon verifying the existing positions of opposing forces stationed at the glacier; introducing; in addition to international boundary, working boundary, LoC, and CFL, a new term in the lexicon on Kashmir called the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). For Pakistan, these demands are unacceptable because once this line is acknowledged it would be tantamount to validating the Indian aggression in Siachen and by extension in Kashmir as well. While it is desirable that sufficient flexibility be exhibited by Pakistan in resolving the Siachen dispute by making concessions that would prevent costly loss of life, it is another matter to agree to mark an Indian dictated line in Siachen and for good reasons.

India’s aggression in Siachen is a military blunder, which needs to be retracted to avert the senseless loss of life and stop the haemorrhaging of resources. There is a dire need to demilitarise this conflict zone. In such a scenario, a major role can be played by the UNMOGIP (UN Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan) observers in demilitarising the treacherous landscape. These observers, who are mandated by the UN under the authority of a UNSC resolution to monitor the CFL, are present on ground and can perform a positive and active role in overseeing demilitarisation of the Siachen glacier and assuming a post evacuation supervisory role. Perhaps, this is the only way of melting the glacial ice of frigid Indian hostility in Siachen.

India and Pakistan agree to hold more talks:

As predicted, the prime ministers of India and Pakistan agreed during a meeting in Bhutan that their countries should hold further talks to try to repair relations strained since the 2008 Mumbai attacks.  Foreign secretary Nirupama Rao told reporters at a regional summit in Thimphu that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his counterpart Yusuf Raza Gilani had decided their foreign ministers and foreign secretaries (the top diplomats) should meet as soon as possible.

In agreeing to hold more talks, India and Pakistan have overcome the first major obstacle in the way of better ties – the question of what form their dialogue should take. Pakistan had been insisting on a resumption of the formal peace process, or Composite Dialogue, broken off by India after the attack on Mumbai which it blamed on the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group. India had been seeking a way back into talks which stopped short of a full resumption of the composite dialogue.

The prime ministers, who last met in Egypt last July, appear to have sidestepped that problem by agreeing to hold dialogue on all issues, without specifically labeling this as the Composite Dialogue (which incidentally is meant to cover all issues.)

Having dealt with the form of their talks, the hard parts – issues of substance – now lie ahead.

Any easing of tension between the two countries is unlikely to have any immediate impact on the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, where India and Pakistan have been rivals for influence for decades. Pakistan had already moved significant numbers of troops last year from its Indian border in the east to fight Pakistani Taliban militants on its western border with Afghanistan during a brief thaw between the two nuclear-armed countries last summer. According to a Pentagon report released this week, it may have redeployed as many as 100,000 troops from east to west. But that means it is unlikely to redeploy any more right now, particularly given its concerns at what it sees as an Indian military build-up on its eastern boarder.

But the talks between India and Pakistan could ultimately pave the way for a scaling down of the proxy war which the two countries’ intelligence services have been accused of waging in Afghanistan. Over time, that will have a major impact on Pakistan’s willingness to tackle the Afghan Taliban and force them to the negotiating table. (Pakistan’s fight against militants so far has been concentrated on tackling the Pakistani Taliban on its border with Afghanistan rather then those fighting U.S. led forces in Afghanistan.

Pakistani officials complain that India is using its presence in Afghanistan – which grew substantially after the fall of the Pakistan-backed Taliban government in 2001 – to destabilize Pakistan.  They say India’s Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) is giving money and weapons to Baluch separatists in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. They also argue that R&AW agents are indirectly destabilizing Pakistan’s tribal areas on the Afghan border by providing funding to militants via Afghan’s NDS intelligence service. India denies the accusations and has so far refused Pakistani demands that it close down its consulates in the Afghan cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad near the Pakistan border.

Afghanistan has been a haven for years for proxy wars between rival intelligence agencies, often working with little real oversight from national capitals, so it is hard to work out exactly what is going on.  What is clear, however, is that whenever you ask a Pakistani official or diplomat about Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan, they will invariably tell you that they expect in return that the country's security interests vis-a-vis India are met.

With its arrest of Taliban commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Pakistan has demonstrated it is in a uniquely powerful position to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table – making it for now the favored ally of the United States over India. Crucial to watch, therefore, in the months ahead will be whether Pakistan makes headway in its demands for a scaling back of India’s presence in Afghanistan, as the price for its cooperation on bringing the Afghan Taliban to heel. India in turn is unlikely to give much ground on Afghanistan unless it believes it will win concessions elsewhere, either from Pakistan itself or from the United States.

But the battle over Afghanistan, for all its complexities, is the easiest of the issues for the two countries to resolve. In theory, both have a mutual interest in a stable and neutral Afghanistan which neither threatens Pakistan nor is used as a haven for militant groups targeting India.  On paper, both countries have an opportunity to narrow their differences. And while the huge trust deficit between the two usually makes any progress on any subject extremely difficult, their row over Afghanistan is pragmatic rather then existential.

Where it becomes much more emotional between India and Pakistan is the dispute over Kashmir, which goes to the heart of both countries’ identities.  As an Islamic country, Pakistan has always considered Muslim Kashmir should have naturally been part of its territory after partition in 1947; as a secular country, India will not tolerate any territorial changes based on religion. And while India and Pakistan made progress in resolving their dispute over Kashmir in 2007,  you can find plenty of people who are cynical about whether a deal worked out between Indian Prime Minister Singh and former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf would ever have worked.  And significantly, the civilian government which took over from musharraf has virtually disowned it.

Adding fuel to the fire is a row over the role of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, which according to those I spoke to in Pakistan, is unlikely to be disarmed any time soon. Officials say Pakistan cannot risk taking on the Punjab-based militant group while its army is fighting the Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas. Those who do not speak for the government or the security services give both that reason and another – why should Pakistan disarm a group which is fighting for what many Pakistan see as the liberation of Kashmir?

Last, but not least, is a dispute over dwindling, and erratic, water supplies as the Himalayan glaciers which feed rivers in both countries melt, and growing populations in both countries use up more and more water for irrigation.  This is perhaps the most troubling row since it is the one that both countries have least control over. Yet both will be more inclined to blame the other rather than the force of nature or global warming. (For a reality check, do get hold of a copy of this report published in 2005, which predicted that water would become an issue in 2010.)

Compared to the power of the Himalayan and Karakoram rivers; or indeed to the bitter identity-driven debate over Kashmir, the battle for influence between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan looks comparatively simple. If the Thimphu thaw between India and Pakistan leads anywhere, I’d probably expect to see it in Afghanistan first.