As
predicted, the prime ministers of India
and Pakistan agreed during a
meeting in Bhutan that
their countries should hold further talks to try to repair relations strained
since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Foreign secretary Nirupama Rao told
reporters at a regional summit in Thimphu
that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his counterpart Yusuf Raza Gilani had
decided their foreign ministers and foreign secretaries (the top
diplomats) should meet as soon as possible.
In
agreeing to hold more talks, India
and Pakistan
have overcome the first major obstacle in the way of better ties – the
question of what form their dialogue should take. Pakistan had
been insisting on a resumption of the formal peace process, or Composite
Dialogue, broken off by India
after the attack on Mumbai which it blamed on the Pakistan-based
Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group. India
had been seeking a way back into talks which stopped short of a full
resumption of the composite dialogue.
The
prime ministers, who last met in Egypt last July, appear to have sidestepped that problem by agreeing to
hold dialogue on all issues, without specifically labeling this as the
Composite Dialogue (which incidentally is meant to cover all issues.)
Having
dealt with the form of their talks, the hard parts – issues of substance – now lie ahead.
Any
easing of tension between the two countries is unlikely to have any immediate
impact on the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan,
where India and Pakistan have
been rivals for influence for decades. Pakistan
had already moved significant numbers of troops last
year from its Indian border in the east to fight Pakistani Taliban militants on
its western border with Afghanistan
during a brief thaw between the two nuclear-armed countries last summer. According
to a Pentagon report released this week, it may have redeployed as many as
100,000 troops from east to west. But that means it is unlikely to redeploy any
more right now, particularly given its concerns at what
it sees as an Indian military build-up on its eastern boarder.
But
the talks between India and Pakistan could ultimately pave the way for
a scaling down of the proxy war which the two countries’ intelligence
services have been accused of waging in Afghanistan. Over time, that will
have a major impact on Pakistan’s
willingness to tackle the Afghan Taliban and force them to the negotiating
table. (Pakistan’s fight
against militants so far has been concentrated on tackling the Pakistani
Taliban on its border with Afghanistan rather then those fighting U.S. led forces in Afghanistan.
Pakistani
officials complain that India
is using its presence in Afghanistan
– which grew substantially after the fall of the Pakistan-backed Taliban
government in 2001 – to destabilize Pakistan. They say India’s Research and Analysis Wing
(R&AW) is giving money and weapons to Baluch separatists in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. They also argue that R&AW agents are indirectly destabilizing
Pakistan’s tribal
areas on the Afghan border by providing funding to militants via Afghan’s
NDS intelligence service. India denies
the accusations and has so far refused Pakistani demands that it close down its
consulates in the Afghan cities of Kandahar and
Jalalabad near the Pakistan border.
Afghanistan has been a haven for years for proxy wars
between rival intelligence agencies, often working with little real
oversight from national capitals, so it is hard to work out exactly what
is going on. What is clear, however, is that whenever you ask a
Pakistani official or diplomat about Pakistan’s
cooperation with the United States
in Afghanistan, they will
invariably tell you that they expect in return that the country's security interests vis-a-vis India are met.
With
its arrest
of Taliban commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Pakistan
has demonstrated it is in a uniquely powerful position to bring the Taliban to
the negotiating table – making it for now the favored
ally of the United States over
India.
Crucial to watch, therefore, in the months ahead will be whether Pakistan makes
headway in its demands for a scaling back of India’s presence in Afghanistan,
as the price for its cooperation on bringing the Afghan Taliban to heel. India in turn is unlikely to give much ground on
Afghanistan unless it
believes it will win concessions elsewhere, either from Pakistan itself or from the United States.
But
the battle over Afghanistan,
for all its complexities, is the easiest of the issues for the two
countries to resolve. In theory, both have a mutual interest in a stable
and neutral Afghanistan
which neither threatens Pakistan
nor is used as a haven for militant groups targeting India. On paper,
both countries have an opportunity to narrow their differences. And while
the huge trust deficit between the two usually makes any progress on
any subject extremely difficult, their row over Afghanistan is pragmatic rather then existential.
Where
it becomes much more emotional between India
and Pakistan is the
dispute over Kashmir, which goes to the heart
of both countries’ identities. As an Islamic country, Pakistan has always considered Muslim
Kashmir should have naturally been part of its territory after partition
in 1947; as a secular country, India
will not tolerate any territorial changes based on religion. And while India and Pakistan made
progress in resolving their dispute over Kashmir in 2007, you
can find plenty of people who are cynical about whether a
deal worked out between
Indian Prime Minister Singh and former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf
would ever have worked. And significantly, the civilian government which took over from musharraf has virtually disowned it.
Adding
fuel to the fire is a row over the role of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, which according
to those I spoke to in Pakistan, is
unlikely to be disarmed any time soon. Officials say Pakistan cannot
risk taking on the Punjab-based militant group while its army is fighting
the Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas. Those who do not speak for
the government or the security services give both that reason and another – why
should Pakistan disarm a
group which is fighting for what many Pakistan see as the liberation of Kashmir?
Last,
but not least, is
a dispute over dwindling, and erratic, water supplies as
the Himalayan glaciers which feed rivers in both countries melt, and growing
populations in both countries use up more and more water for
irrigation. This is perhaps the most troubling row since it is the
one that both countries have least control over. Yet both will be more
inclined to blame the other rather than the force of nature or global warming.
(For a reality check, do get hold of a copy of this report published
in 2005, which predicted that water would become an issue in 2010.)
Compared
to the power of the Himalayan and Karakoram rivers; or indeed to the bitter
identity-driven debate over Kashmir, the battle for influence between India and Pakistan
in Afghanistan
looks comparatively simple. If the Thimphu thaw between India and Pakistan
leads anywhere, I’d probably expect to see it in Afghanistan first.
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